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We consider a mean-variance general equilibrium economy where the expected returns for 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders are different because the former are able to 
divert a fraction of the profits. We find that when investor protection is poor, asset return 
correlation affects ownership structure in a positive way. Higher return correlation lowers the 
benefits of diversification which causes a higher investment by the controlling shareholder in 
his asset and a lower investment by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysis 
supports the predictions of the model. In particular, controlling for measures of the quality of 
the investor protection, the legal origin of the countries, and other structural variables as in a 
previous study by La Porta et al. (1998) we find that equity ownership is significantly more 
concentrated in countries where stock return correlation is higher, and that the magnitude of 
this effect is larger in countries where investor protection is poorer. 
JEL Code: D8, G2, G3. 
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Munich which he thanks for its hospitality. The usual disclaimer applies. Recent research reveals a number of important diﬀerences among countries in terms
of ownership structure, portfolio allocation, and stock market participation. One strand
of literature argues that these diﬀerences are shaped by the extent of legal protection
for outside shareholders (La Porta et al. 1997, Kumar et al. 1999, La Porta et al.
1999, Nenova 1999, among others). Ownership concentration in particular is related
to poor governance: for example, in Jensen and Meckling (1976) ownership aligns the
interests of controlling and non-controlling shareholders; in Zingales (1994) and La Porta
et al. (1998) ownership concentration is seen as a response to poor investor protection.
A number of empirical studies show that ownership is more concentrated in countries
with poorer investor protection (see for example La Porta et al. 1998). The presence
of control beneﬁts is the most common explanation for ownership concentration and
the resulting loss of diversiﬁcation beneﬁts (Zingales 1994, Demsetz and Lehn 1985).
Theoretical work in this area is only starting to develop. Most existing models, though,
are constructed in a partial equilibrium framework with risk-neutral agents (La Porta
et al. 1998, 1999, Zingales 1995, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000).1
The objective of this paper is to further the understanding of the above mentioned
diﬀerences by showing that, when investor protection is poor, ownership concentration is
aﬀected by diversiﬁcation opportunities. More speciﬁcally, we show that diversiﬁcation
opportunities, which we measure as the stock returns correlation in a given economy -
the “local market correlation” - matter in explaining portfolio allocation and therefore
ownership structure.
To address these issues theoretically we consider a mean-variance general equilibrium
economy with one risk-free asset and a large number of risky assets, that can be inter-
preted as “ﬁrms”. Some investors, the “savers”, have no control of any ﬁrm whereas
others, the “entrepreneurs”, each have control of their ﬁrm. Controlling shareholders
obtain higher expected returns than non-controlling shareholders because they are able
to divert a fraction of the proﬁts of the ﬁrm they control. Since the returns on the
risky assets are imperfectly correlated there are beneﬁts from portfolio diversiﬁcation.
The portfolio decisions of all individuals generate a demand for the shares. The model
determines the fraction of the endowment wealth invested in the risk-free asset and in
the risky assets and, as a result, both the total amount invested in each ﬁrm and the
ownership structure of the ﬁrms.
The theoretical model yields several insights. First, we ﬁnd that proﬁt diversion
induces controlling shareholders to hold less diversiﬁed portfolios. A higher level of proﬁt
diversion makes controlling shareholders retain both (i) a larger share of the assets they
control, and (ii) a smaller share of the other assets than would be required only without
private beneﬁts. The ﬁrst part of this result is well known in the literature. For example,
Zingales (1994) observes that there is little reason to hold a large controlling block of
shares unless there are beneﬁts of control. However, low portfolio diversiﬁcation may
also arise as a result of a second eﬀect: the presence of control rights enjoyed by other
1An exception is the general equilibrium study by Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) that in a risk-
neutral environment examines the impact of the endogenously determined level of investor protection
on the ownership structure of ﬁrms that go public.
1controlling shareholders induces an even lower investment in the risky assets controlled
by other entrepreneurs. This theoretical result is consistent with the stylized fact noted
by La Porta et al. (1999) that in general there is no other large shareholder to monitor
the controlling shareholder.
Second, lower portfolio diversiﬁcation in turn leads to ownership concentration, de-
ﬁned as the fraction of the shares of a ﬁrm held by the controlling shareholder with
respect to the shares of the same ﬁrm held by the other entrepreneurs. Ownership
concentration increases when diversiﬁcation opportunities decline. When diversiﬁca-
tion opportunities decline, other things being equal, each controlling shareholder invests
a larger share of his wealth in the assets he controls. This result arises because the
cost of poor diversiﬁcation is low when correlation is high and thus each controlling
shareholder can divert a larger amount of proﬁts sacriﬁcing less portfolio diversiﬁcation.
Similarly, when diversiﬁcation opportunities decline, non-controlling investors allocate a
lower fraction of their wealth to the assets that they do not control.
Third, the impact of local market correlation on ownership concentration is ampliﬁed
by poor investor protection. The reason is that the poorer the investor protection, the
lower the cost of sacriﬁcing diversiﬁcation and thus poor investor protection reinforces
local market correlation in making it more attractive for controlling shareholders to
invest in the assets they control.
Fourth, because the controlling shareholders can appropriate more proﬁts than non-
controlling shareholders, the classical two-funds separation theorem does not hold here,
and investors’ portfolios composition of risky assets are diﬀerent. This result is related
to Merton’s (1987) study of capital market equilibria with incomplete information, to
Admati et al. (1994) who show that the large shareholder does not hold the market
portfolio, and to Easley and O’Hara (2004) who show that uninformed investors demand
a higher return for holding stocks with less available public information.
The basic trade-oﬀ between risk-sharing and the (private) beneﬁts of concentrated
ownership that drives our results is closely related to Admati et al. (1994). They
study the trade-oﬀ between achieving a high degree of monitoring, which is promoted
by concentrated ownership, and realizing risk-sharing gains, which requires more diﬀuse
ownership. Share holding acts as a commitment device to monitor: to extract the surplus
generated by increased monitoring, the large shareholder increases his holdings which
leads him to overinvest in the risky security. Similarly Bolton and vonThadden (1998)
study the liquidity beneﬁts associated with dispersed ownership and the beneﬁts from
eﬃcient management arising from ownership concentration. In our model, however,
ownership concentration does not increase eﬃciency but arises only as a result of the
controlling shareholder’s ability to divert proﬁts which makes it more attractive for him
to invest in his own ﬁrm.
Notice that although in the ﬁnancial agency literature the ultimate source of proﬁt
diversion is moral hazard (Jensen and Meckling 1976), in our paper we do not focus on
moral hazard per se. We consider instead a reduced form problem where the primitive
is the level of legal investor protection that determines the level of proﬁts that insiders
2divert. This allows us to have a manageable framework to trace the feedbacks of the
wedge between the expected returns of controlling and non-controlling shareholders.
Then we analyze if our theoretical prediction is empirically relevant. More speciﬁ-
cally, we take the model to the data and investigate whether local market correlation
matters in explaining ownership structure after controlling for variables considered in
previous studies. As measure of ownership concentration we take the percentage of the
shares owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest companies in a group of
countries from La Porta et al. (1998). The main measure of local market correlation
that we use is the weighted average of pair-wise correlations between industry stock
indexes in 38 countries for the period 1998-2000. Recent studies (see Morck et al. 2000,
and Jin and Myers 2004) show that measures of stock price synchronicity diﬀer sharply
across countries. Similarly, in our sample local market correlation ranges from 0.23 in
Australia to 0.80 in Malaysia and Turkey, with a mean of 0.52 (see Table IV and Table
V). It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the many causes of the variability
of local market correlation that might be related for example to comparative advantage
in certain industries, availability of natural resources, and historical reasons leading to
diﬀerent patterns of ﬁnancial development. What matters for us is that diﬀerent stock
price synchronicity may lead to diﬀerent diversiﬁcation opportunities for domestic in-
vestors.
Our main empirical ﬁnding is the novel result that ownership is more concentrated in
countries where local market correlation is higher consistently with the model prediction.
Furthermore, when a measure of the negative of investor protection (i.e. poor gover-
nance) is interacted with local market correlation, the estimated coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant
and has a positive sign consistently with the model prediction that poor governance
ampliﬁes the impact of local market correlation on ownership concentration. These re-
sults are robust with respect to diﬀerent measures of correlations and diﬀerent model
speciﬁcations aiming at capturing the eﬀect of omitted variables that could aﬀect both
ownership concentration and local market correlation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the basic model set-
up. Section II presents the optimal portfolio, the optimal ownership structure and the
comparative static results w.r.t. local market correlation. Section III tests the empirical
relevance of our results and presents our ﬁndings on the relation between ownership
structure and diversiﬁcation opportunities. Section IV discusses some possible extensions
and concludes.
I Model set-up
A Investments and individuals
Consider a two-period closed economy with n + 1 assets. The investment in asset i =
1,..,n+1 at time 0 is Ii. The gross return from asset i at time 1 is ˜ Ri (Ii). Investments
3in assets 1,...,n are risky; for i = 1,...,n we have ˜ Ri (Ii) = (mi + ǫi)Ii, where mi is
the gross expected return per unit of investment in asset i, ǫi is a random variable with
E (ǫi) = 0,E (ǫiǫj) = σij > 0,i  = j and E (ǫ2
i) = σ2
i. Thus, the correlation coeﬃcient
ρij ≡ σij/(σiσj) is larger than zero so that risk cannot be completely eliminated from any
portfolio. We also assume that ρij < 1, i.e. there are diversiﬁcation opportunities. Asset
n + 1 is the risk-free asset with rate of return normalized to zero; that is ˜ Rn+1 (In+1) =
In+1. The functions ˜ Ri (Ii),i = 1,...,n + 1, can be interpreted as production functions
whose inputs are the investments Ii. Asset returns arise from linear technologies and
thus are not aﬀected by the size of the investment.
There are n + 1 individuals. Individuals 1,...,n are “entrepreneurs”. Individual
n + 1 represents the household sector of the economy that we will consider as a unique
representative agent the “saver”. Each individual j = 1,...,n+1 is endowed with Wj > 0
units of the risk-free asset that he can store investing in the risk-free asset itself; for the
whole economy the total endowment of wealth is W =
 n+1
j=1 Wj units of the risk-free
asset.
Entrepreneur i, “controls” risky asset i, i = 1,...,n. Who is an entrepreneur and who
is a saver and which asset an entrepreneur controls is exogenously determined. We have
assumed that the number of entrepreneurs match the number of risky assets thus ruling
out the possibility that one entrepreneur controls several assets, and that the same asset
can be controlled by more than one entrepreneur. Control allows each entrepreneur
to divert part of the realized proﬁts of the assets he controls. Following La Porta et
al. (1998) we assume that the amount of proﬁt diversion is determined both by the
rules that protect outside investors and by the quality of the enforcement of these rules.
These rules and their enforcement depend also on the jurisdiction in which the assets are
invested and cover, for example, voting power and legal protection against expropriation
by management. We are considering a closed economy because investor protection is
speciﬁc to a given jurisdiction and individuals have diﬃculty investing abroad to exploit
diversiﬁcation opportunities, better investor protection, and higher returns.
Proﬁt diversion takes the form of monetary beneﬁts B (Ii) that entrepreneur i receives
from the asset i = 1,...,n that he controls. The saver is not able to extract beneﬁts.
For the risk-free asset all return is paid to outsiders since there is no proﬁt diversion:
B (In+1) = 0.
Our assumption that the limited investor protection introduces a wedge between the
returns of the controlling and non-controlling shareholders can be seen as a reduced form
of a more general incentive problem where one party can obtain rents e.g. because of an
information advantage. Following Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1997), suppose for example
that an entrepreneur can work hard or shirk; shirking allows him to obtain private
beneﬁts but lowers the probability of success; this introduces an incentive constraint to
induce the entrepreneur to work hard; to satisfy this constraint the entrepreneur must be
given a rent proportional to the foregone beneﬁts. This rent can be seen as the source
of the wedge between the income generated by the assets and the income payable to
outsiders.
4B Cash ﬂow rights
Cash ﬂow rights from asset i, i = 1,...,n, deﬁned as gross return net of the diverted
proﬁts, are
  Yi (Ii) = ˜ Ri (Ii) − B (Ii) (1)
with the rate of return   yi =
  Yi(Ii)−Ii
Ii and expectation E(  yi) = yi.
For the sake of simplicity we consider the case in which proﬁt diversion is proportional
to the size of the investment and thus can be interpreted as a deterministic salary or
a management fee to the controlling shareholder, paid out of stochastic income. In
particular, we deﬁne B (Ii) = biIi, where bi ≥ 0 for i = 1,...,n. The parameter bi
measures the amount of proﬁt diversion as a fraction of the initial investment. For
simplicity we assume that bi is the same for each risky asset (bi = b,i = 1,...,n).2 This
way of modelling proﬁt diversion is consistent with the ample empirical evidence showing
that the scope for proﬁt diversion grows with ﬁrm size.
To focus on the impact of local market correlation on portfolio decisions, we assume
that all the risky assets have the same expected returns and standard deviations (mi =
m,σi = σ,i = 1,...,n), and that the correlation coeﬃcients between the returns on the
risky assets are identical to ρ. An entrepreneur investing in the asset he controls is
entitled to receive both the expected cash ﬂow rights like any other shareholder, and
the control beneﬁts. The expected rate of return on the risky assets, m − 1, which is
ﬁxed given the linearity of the return function, can be split in two parts: y = m−1−b
are the expected cash-ﬂow rights accruing pro rata to all shareholders; b are the proﬁts
diverted by the controlling shareholder.
We make a number of assumptions about the parameters. First, we assume that




, with y ≥ −1, that is, for all i, m+ǫi > b for all realization of ǫi, so that proﬁt
diversion can happen also when income is low. This captures the idea that insiders can
divert proﬁts even if the company performs poorly: the recent corporate scandals in the
U.S. and in Europe provide ample evidence that insiders could obtain large payoﬀs even
when companies fail. Second, the expected rate of return on the risky asset y must be
positive (i.e. m − 1 > b) otherwise storage dominates and the optimal investment of the
saver in the risky assets is zero, that is, limited market participation is directly linked to
a high level of proﬁt diversion.3 Finally, to avoid the modelling shortfall that all wealth
is invested in the risky assets, we assume that m − 1 − b is not “too” large.
2Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) observe that legal protection could vary across industries (higher in
regulated industries), and could depend on the ownership structure of ﬁrms, e.g. the monitoring of a
second large shareholder could result in a higher eﬀective level of investor protection (Bennedsen and
Wolfenzon 2000, La Porta et al. 1999, Pagano and R¨ oell 1998). However, to keep the model simple, we
assume that the level of investor protection is the same for all industries in a given economy and does
not depend on the ownership structure.
3There is ample empirical evidence (see e.g. Guiso et al. 2002) indicating that in countries where
the potential for proﬁt diversion is high household market participation is low.
5II Ownership structure
A The portfolio problem
We concentrate on a portfolio problem where individuals allocate their initial wealth to
maximize their expected utility. We have simpliﬁed the problem of maximizing ﬁrms’
proﬁt by assuming a linear technology that yields a perfectly elastic demand for funds.
Thus we have taken the return process of securities and therefore their prices as given,
an approach often followed in portfolio problems (Cochrane 2001). In this way we lose
the eﬀect of size on the marginal return on the investment and therefore on the cost of
capital. However, we gain a much simpliﬁed framework that allows us to determine the
optimal investment size, an aspect usually neglected. Indeed, in most cases the opposite
is true: the demand for funds is given (i.e. investment size) by the observed market
portfolio (in line with the classical CAPM model) or normalized to one (see for example
Admati et al. 1994) and the equilibrium cost of capital is endogenously determined.
We assume that the entrepreneur maintains control after the initial share oﬀering
(Zingales 1995) and that control does not depend on the shares owned. This captures
the idea that shares with multiple votes, voting trusts, cross-ownership arrangements,
etc. can shield the controlling shareholder from the market from corporate control and
allow him to maintain control also with a small fraction of the shares.
To determine the amount of investment in the various assets we consider the problem
of individual j = 1,...,n + 1 that must choose how to allocate his wealth by purchasing
claims on the cash ﬂow rights of n + 1 assets. We assume that each individual’s prefer-
ences are represented by a utility function Vj deﬁned over the mean and the variance of
the portfolio’s return, the initial wealth and the level of proﬁt diversion. We assume that
all individuals have the same relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, λ. We envision a situation
where each entrepreneur behaves as a price taker and approaches potential investors
proposing to raise whatever capital they are willing to provide, by oﬀering shares in his
start-up ﬁrm.
In the text we present the case with three assets, two risky and one safe, and three
individuals, two entrepreneurs and one saver, leaving the general case to the appendix.
All the qualitative results and the comparative statics are the same. Let xji be the




xji = 1. (2)
The accounting identity linking the individual portfolio shares and the total investment
in the risky assets is
Ii = x1iW1+,...,+x3iW3, i = 1,2. (3)
Denote with












the portfolio’s expected rate of return and variance per unit of wealth, respectively.











Wj + B (Ij) (6)
with B (Ii) = bIi for i = 1,2, B (I3) = 0 s.t. his budget constraint (2) and (3). We
assume that W1 = W2 = 1,W3 > 0.
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λσ2 (ρ + 1)
−
b
λσ2 (1 + ρ)
for i = 1,2. (9)
The proof for the general case is presented in the appendix. The portfolio weights
in all three equations (7), 8) and (9) have two components. The ﬁrst is the solution of
the classical Tobin-Markowitz mean-variance analysis which depends on the expected
cash-ﬂow rights and is common to all the investors. The second term characterizes the
diﬀerences among the portfolio weights of investors. In equation (7), which describes the
proportion of the wealth of entrepreneur i in the assets he controls, the second term is
the incentive stemming from proﬁt diversion: the incentive for an entrepreneur to invest
in his company is related to the level of proﬁt diversion and it is ampliﬁed by the level
of ρ that increases the numerator and decreases the denominator of the second term. In
equation (8), that represents the proportion of wealth that the entrepreneur invests in
the other ﬁrm, the second term is decreasing in the amount of proﬁt diversion and the
eﬀect is ampliﬁed by the level of correlation: the incentive of the entrepreneur to invest
in the other ﬁrm is related to the amount of proﬁt diversion extracted by the controlling
shareholder and the opportunities of diversiﬁcation oﬀered by such asset. Therefore,
proﬁt diversion “double counts” on the amount of wealth the entrepreneur invests in his
ﬁrm. Indeed, this amount is high not only because of proﬁt diversion but also because
each entrepreneur will see his returns reduced by the extraction of proﬁts by another
entrepreneur if he invests in somebody else’s ﬁrm. This eﬀect is ampliﬁed by the level
of diversiﬁcation opportunities. In equation (9), that shows the portfolio weights of the
saver, the second term is decreasing in the amount of proﬁt diversion.
Notice that investors do not hold the same portfolios. Proﬁt diversion introduces a
wedge between the expected return for controlling and non-controlling shareholders that
perceive a diﬀerent risk-return trade-oﬀ. Hence it is optimal to hold diﬀerent portfolios
7and the standard two-fund separation theorem does not hold here. A similar result is
found in Easley and O’Hara (2004) where uninformed investors demand a higher return
to hold stocks with less public information available. In that paper, private information
introduces a wedge that cannot be arbitraged away either by holding more stocks or
by holding more money but which requires a higher return by the uninformed thus
increasing the cost of capital.
Despite the presence of proﬁt diversion, as in a classical portfolio problem, the pro-
portion of the saver’s wealth invested in the cash ﬂow rights of the risky assets is positive
under the maintained assumption that proﬁt diversion is not so large as to expropriate
the saver completely; i.e. b < m−1. Notice that non-controlling shareholders will invest




∂b < 0,j  = i = 1,2 and
∂x∗
3i
∂b < 0,i = 1,2.
Moreover, each controlling shareholder invests a fraction of his wealth in the asset




ij > 1, i,j = 1,2, which
makes entrepreneurs’ portfolios concentrated. The loss of diversiﬁcation is compensated
by the higher expected return in the investment in the assets he controls and by the
lower total amount of proﬁt diversion recognized to the other entrepreneur. This ef-
fect is stronger when local market correlation is higher as summarized in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 1 When local market correlation increases, each entrepreneur invests a
higher fraction of his wealth in the asset he controls and a lower fraction in the other
risky asset. This applies only after some threshold level of correlation is achieved.
Proof. See the appendix.
Several comments are in order. First, if local market correlation is suﬃciently high,
when local market correlation increases (diversiﬁcation opportunities decline) each con-
trolling shareholder’s loss of diversiﬁcation opportunities becomes less important w.r.t.
the additional proﬁts that can be diverted. Thus each controlling shareholder increases
his investment in the assets he controls and invests less in the other risky assets.
Second, it must be stressed that the relationship between portfolio concentration and
local market correlation becomes relevant only when investor protection is imperfect. In
fact a necessary condition for the result in Proposition (1) is positive proﬁt diversion;
it is easy to see that when b = 0 the portfolio weights of the risky assets are the same
for all the individuals and when local market correlation increases they all invest a
lower, not higher, fraction of their wealth in both risky assets. Thus the loss in portfolio
diversiﬁcation stems from the joint eﬀect of proﬁt diversion and local market correlation,
not just local market correlation.
8B Equilibrium ownership structure
From the optimal portfolio weights, x∗
ij, of each individual the equilibrium ownership
structure of the assets follows immediately. In equilibrium, the supply of funds is equal to
the demand for funds and the total amount invested in each risky asset can be obtained












2(m − 1) − b + W3 (m − 1 − b)
λσ2 (ρ + 1)
i = 1,2, (11)
and the resource constraint





From (11) we observe that the investments in the risky assets decline when the protection
of non-controlling shareholders declines,
∂I∗
i
∂b < 0,i = 1,2, as veriﬁed empirically by La
Porta et al. (1998) and Castro, Clementi, MacDonald (2004). Similarly, quite intuitively





From the optimal portfolio weights and the amount invested in the risky assets, I∗
i ,
with i = 1,2, we determine the fraction α∗
ji of the cash ﬂow rights of asset i owned
by individual j = 1,2,3. An individual j, that invests a fraction x∗
ji of his wealth Wj
in asset i spends x∗
jiWj. Since the total value of individual j′s holding of asset i, α∗
jiI∗
i
must equal the amount individual j spends in asset i, then the relation between the
proportion of wealth invested by each individual j in assets i, and the shares owned by
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2(m − 1) − b + W3 (m − 1 − b)
. (16)
Equations (14), (15), and (16) allow us to analyze the ownership structure of the assets
and yield the most important insights of the paper.
We deﬁne concentrated an ownership structure in which the two entrepreneurs do
not hold the same fraction of shares. Our ﬁrst result shows that the optimal ownership
structure is concentrated because the relative share of the cash ﬂow rights of the con-
trolling entrepreneur is larger than that of the other entrepreneur; α∗
ii > α∗
ji j  = i = 1,2.
The saver has a diﬀerent level of wealth and his shares cannot be directly compared with
those of the entrepreneurs. Notice however, that in the case of identical wealth the saver












∂b < 0 and
∂a∗
31
∂b < 0. This result is strictly related to
the eﬀect of proﬁt diversion on portfolio weights. As equation (13) shows, ownership
concentration arises not only because the controlling shareholder invests a higher fraction
of his wealth in his ﬁrm (xii increases), as stressed by Zingales (1994), but also because
the non-controlling shareholders invest less in that ﬁrm.
Third, the impact of local market correlation on ownership concentration is shown
in the following Proposition that provides our main testable implications.
Proposition 2 When investor protection is limited, ownership becomes more concen-
trated as local market correlation increases: in fact in the presence of proﬁt diversion




∂ρ > 0), those of the other entrepreneur decline (
∂a∗
ji
∂ρ < 0), and those
of the saver remain unchanged (
∂a∗
31
∂ρ = 0). Moreover, poor investor protection ampliﬁes




∂ρ w.r.t. b is positive, and the derivative of
∂a∗
ji
∂ρ w.r.t. b is negative.
Proof. See the appendix.
This Proposition illustrates the interaction between local market correlation, own-
ership concentration and investor protection. When local market correlation increases,
the controlling shareholder faces a lower loss from foregone diversiﬁcation opportunities
arising from concentrated ownership (thus he invests more in his ﬁrm) and the non-
controlling shareholders face less attractive risky securities (thus they invest less in that
ﬁrm).
4We have assumed that control is not contestable. However, the result that a∗
ii > a∗
ji has implications
for the control of the assets. In particular, it implies that the only other individual in the economy
capable of extracting private beneﬁts (the other entrepreneur) ﬁnds it optimal to acquire only a minority
stake in a ﬁrm controlled by somebody else, even if control is contestable.
10Furthermore the impact of diversiﬁcation opportunities on ownership concentration
is ampliﬁed by proﬁt diversion. The poorer the investor protection, the lower the cost of
sacriﬁcing diversiﬁcation opportunities to pursue private beneﬁts through concentrated
ownership. In the limit, absent proﬁt diversion as in a Tobin-Markowitz world for
example (b = 0), diversiﬁcation opportunities play no role in ownership concentration
as can be seen from equations (14) and (15). Similarly, even in the presence of proﬁt
diversion the share of the saver is not aﬀected by local market correlation since he is not






3i an increase in ρ causes a decrease in x∗
3i and a decrease in I∗
i of the
same amount so that
∂α∗
31
∂ρ = 0 while
∂x∗
31
∂ρ < 0. As shown in the appendix, Proposition
(2) also applies to the general case with n + 1 assets.
Notice ﬁnally that in Admati et al. (1994) and Bolton and vonThadden (1998)
ownership concentration has beneﬁcial incentive eﬀects that increase returns although
at the cost of poorer diversiﬁcation and lower liquidity, respectively. On the contrary,
in our model, ownership concentration has no positive incentive eﬀect but is just an
instrument to obtain a higher overall level of proﬁt diversion.
C A numerical example
The potential magnitude of the impact of local market correlation on ownership concen-
tration can be illustrated by a simple numerical example. The speciﬁc value to attach to
some of the model’s parameters is surely debatable. As our focus is on the comparative
static eﬀects of changes induced by the correlation parameter, we adopt simple base
levels for the model’s structural parameters. Thus we set the expected return from the








generated by changing the level of correlation,
ρ, and the level of proﬁt diversion, b.
[INSERT Table (I) about here]
Table (I) shows how changes in ρ and b aﬀect the ownership structure. The exam-
ple shows that the eﬀect of correlation on ownership structure depends on the level of
proﬁt diversion. When there is no proﬁt diversion (b = 0), correlation has no eﬀect on
ownership structure. However, when proﬁt diversion is positive, correlation matters. To
show this result we consider a range of values for b and ρ. In particular, the range of b
is from 0.006 (the minimum percentage of proﬁt diversion observed per dollar invested
in some empirical studies, e.g. Faccio and Lang 2002) to 0.020 (the maximum observed
in the same study) and the range of local market correlation, ρ, is from 0.23 to 0.80
(respectively, the minimum and the maximum observed in our sample; see Table (IV)).
An increase in b from the minimum to the maximum yields a change in the share of the
controlling shareholder (respectively, other entrepreneur) from 35% to 41% (from 32%
to 28%) for the lowest level of correlation. Ownership becomes even more concentrated
11when correlation increases: from 41% to 67% for the controlling shareholder (from 28%
to 2% for the other entrepreneur) for the maximum level of investor protection. There-
fore, the joint eﬀect of proﬁt diversion and correlation changes the ownership structure
from 35% to 67% for the controlling shareholder and from 32% to 2% for the other
entrepreneur. Thus, the eﬀect of correlation on ownership concentration is of a similar
order of magnitude to proﬁt diversion.
In the next section we move from the theoretical model to its testing on a group of
countries.
III Empirical analysis
In this section we investigate empirically if local market correlation matters in explain-
ing ownership concentration. It should be remembered that the model predicts that
ownership is more concentrated in countries with higher local market correlation and
that this relationship is ampliﬁed by poor investor protection. To test these hypothe-
ses, we regress ownership concentration against local market correlation, several control
variables, and other explanatory variables.
A Data Description
Our main measure of local market correlation is a weighted average of industry stock
indexes. We estimate correlations between industry stock indexes in 38 countries (see
Table IV) using monthly returns for the three-year sample 1998-2000 from Datastream
stock prices.5 We consider stock indexes rather than individual stocks on the ground that
the returns on the industry indexes are better indicators of the primitive states of nature
in the economy and thus are taken as proxies for the asset returns of the theoretical
model. The 10 industries in the Datastream database are: Resources, Basic Industries,
General Industrials, Cyclical Consumption Goods, Non-Cyclical Consumption Goods,
Cyclical Services, Non-Cyclical Services, Utilities, Information Technology, Financial.
We calculate the pair-wise correlation among the 10 industry returns and determine the
average pair-wise industry correlation using as weights the market capitalizations of each
industry index. This measure is able to capture the average correlation among the asset
returns, the parameter ρ of our theoretical model.
A detailed description of this and the other variables used in the analysis and their
sources can be found in Tables (II) and (III)).
[INSERT Table (II) about here]
5We have also considered the correlation based on the ﬁve-year sample 1996-2000 for which a smaller
number of countries is available. The lower number of countries is the only reason why we preferred
the three-year sample. Nevertheless the results of the ﬁve-year sample are qualitatively similar and we
do not report them here.
12[INSERT Table (III) about here]
The data on Ownership concentration are from La Porta et al. (1998) and indicate
the percentage of the shares owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest
companies (see Table IV). We take the shares of the top three shareholders as a proxy
for the shares of the controlling entrepreneur, under the assumption that all the largest
shareholders have the potential to divert proﬁts.
[INSERT Table (IV) about here]
To deﬁne our control variables we use the explanatory variables of La Porta et al.
(1998). In particular we use: the logarithm of GNP per capita on the idea that richer
countries may have diﬀerent ownership patterns, the logarithm of total GDP on the
idea that larger economies have larger ﬁrms which might have lower Ownership concen-
tration, the Gini coeﬃcient for a country’s income as a proxy of the level of inequality
in the society, and several measures of the legal system such as Legal origin dummies
(French, English, German, the omitted dummy being Scandinavian). As additional con-
trol variables we consider the four measures of the quality of the legal system that La
Porta et al. (1998) show to be statistically signiﬁcant in their study, namely Antidi-
rectors rights (a measure of shareholders protection), Accounting standards, Mandatory
dividend (describes whether there are rules that force ﬁrms to pay dividends), Legal
reserve required (the percentage of total share capital mandated by Corporate Law to
avoid the dissolution of an existing ﬁrm). We consider all these four indexes proxies
for (the inverse of) proﬁt diversion b. We limit our analysis to these variables given the
small dataset.
Table (V) displays the univariate statistics and Table (VI) the simple correlation
coeﬃcients for our main variable of stock returns correlation (Local market correlation)
Ownership concentration and the structural variables listed above.
[INSERT Table (V) about here]
[INSERT Table (VI) about here]
The univariate statistics show that Local market correlation and Ownership concen-
tration are diﬀerent across countries. The sign of the correlation coeﬃcients for our
stock returns correlation and ownership concentration are largely as expected from our
theoretical model. Moreover, Antidirectors rights and local market correlation are statis-
tically unrelated; indeed, despite the negative correlation, the coeﬃcient is not diﬀerent
from zero.6 This result is consistent with the relation found by Morck et al. (2000).
6We have tested the correlation coeﬃcient by regressing Local market correlation against Antidirec-
tors rights. Even if we introduce control variables in the analysis the result does not change.
13We stress that it is not an objective of this paper to explain why stock correlation
diﬀers across countries.7 Rather, the key point of our research is that diversiﬁcation
opportunities matter in explaining ownership concentration and that poor investor pro-
tection alone is not able to capture all the variability of ownership concentration among
countries. In particular, as our model and numerical example show, there are two sets of
explanatory variables that have to be considered in analyzing ownership concentration:
one is investor protection, which we measure with Antidirectors rights, and the other
is diversiﬁcation opportunities. As shown above, notice that Antidirectors rights and
diversiﬁcation opportunities, measured by Local market correlation, are unrelated.
Furthermore, Figure (1) shows that countries with diﬀerent levels of Antidirectors
rights might have the same diversiﬁcation opportunities and countries with the diﬀerent
diversiﬁcation opportunities may have the same level of Antidirectors rights. In par-
ticular, we observe almost all the levels of Local market correlation for each value of
Antidirectors rights. This means that not only local market correlation diﬀers among
countries but that it diﬀers among countries with the same level of minority sharehold-
ers protection. The implication is that ownership concentration could be diﬀerent for
countries with identical levels of Antidirectors rights. For instance, in our dataset there
are countries (see for example Italy, Mexico,Venezuela) with the same level of Antidirec-
tors rights as Germany and lower diversiﬁcation opportunities but a higher ownership
concentration. On the other side Singapore has a high level of Antidirectors rights but
few diversiﬁcation opportunities and again a high ownership concentration.
[INSERT Figure (1) about here]
B Ownership concentration and local market correlation
One of the model predictions is that Ownership concentration increases when diversiﬁca-
tion opportunities decline. To test this hypothesis, we regress Ownership concentration
against Local market correlation, several control variables, and several explanatory vari-
ables. Table (VII) shows the results.
[INSERT Table (VII) about here]
The ﬁrst column of Table (VII) shows the explanatory power of the control variables
used by La Porta et al. (1998). The second column of Table (VII) reports the results from
a baseline speciﬁcation using both the control variables and the explanatory variables
suggested by La Porta et al. (1998).8
7Note that the few studies on this issue, Morck et al (2000) and Jin and Myers (2004), have so far
been unable to oﬀer a convincing explanation.
8The results are in line with those reported by La Porta et al. (1998). Though some of the countries
in our sample are diﬀerent from those in their study the signs and values of the coeﬃcients statistically
diﬀerent from zero are very similar to those in La Porta et al. (1998).
14To document the extent to which diversiﬁcation opportunities aﬀect ownership con-
centration, we extend the empirical speciﬁcation used by La Porta et al. (1998) by
including the Local market correlation variable. The results are reported in the third
column of Table (VII). An increase in Local market correlation, all else being equal,
is associated with an increase in ownership concentration. In particular, Local market
correlation matters in that its coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and has the ex-
pected positive sign. The impact of local market correlation on Ownership concentration
is sizeable. The estimated coeﬃcient suggests that an increase of one standard devia-
tion of Local market correlation (approximately +13% of Local market correlation) is
associated with an increase of slightly less than half standard deviation of Ownership
concentration (approximately +6% of ownership concentration).
Furthermore, the inclusion of Local market correlation in the regression increases
the explanatory power by 15% (the adjusted R2 increases from 45.2% to 60.8%). This
eﬀect is larger than that of the inclusion of the four measures of the quality of the legal
system described above. In fact, comparing the explanatory power of the regression in
the ﬁrst column - which excludes the four measures of the quality of the legal system -
with that of the regression in the second column - which includes them - we see that the
explanatory power increases by 10% (from 35.1% to 45.2%).
A potential critique of the interpretation that fewer diversiﬁcation opportunities
make ownership more concentrated is that both are aﬀected by common factors. One
such candidate is the protection that the legal system aﬀords to investors. However,
adding local market correlation to the explanatory variables of column 2 (that includes
measures of investor protection) does not aﬀect the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients of these
variables. In particular, adding Local market correlation does not turn the coeﬃcient of
Antidirectors rights insigniﬁcant, the only signiﬁcant measure of investor protection in
the regression in column 2.
We then investigate an additional prediction of the model, namely that the intensity
of the relationship between Local market correlation and Ownership concentration varies
with some exogenous variables. In particular we test whether poor investor protection
ampliﬁes the impact of Local market correlation on Ownership concentration.
[INSERT Table (VIII) about here]
In Table (VIII) we consider a regression where a measure of investor protection is
interacted with local market correlation. For this purpose we have constructed a new
variable, Directors rights, the negative of Antidirectors rights, that takes value 0 when
investor protection is maximum and 5 when investor protection is minimum. We select
Antidirectors rights because it is the only signiﬁcant measure of investor protection in
the regression in column 1. The results show that the impact of Local market correlation
on Ownership concentration is ampliﬁed by poor investor protection. This is consistent
with the model explanation, namely that the poorer the investor protection, the lower
the cost of sacriﬁcing diversiﬁcation opportunities to extract proﬁts.
15A caveat is necessary to interpret our results. We have assumed that the model rep-
resents a closed economy but in reality ﬁnancial markets are open and investors could
potentially invest in ﬁnancial markets around the world. Although the possibility of
investing abroad is real, there is ample empirical evidence that the home bias is relevant
not only for retail investors but also for mutual fund managers and that the price of
risk diﬀers internationally (see for example Levine and Zervos 1998). As long as this is
at least in part true there are diversiﬁcation opportunities that are only domestic and
therefore they matter for ownership concentration. The investigation of the impact of
international capital mobility on diversiﬁcation opportunities and ownership concentra-
tion needs further theoretical and empirical investigation which is beyond the scope of
this paper.
C Robustness analysis
C.1 A parsimonious model speciﬁcation and alternative measures of diver-
siﬁcation opportunities
The ﬁrst analysis of robustness of our result is a more parsimonious speciﬁcation of the
model given the limited dataset. From the theoretical standpoint the main variables to
include are: the size of the country and the governance indicators.
[INSERT Table (IX) about here]
The regressions presented in Table (IX) show that even under a more parsimonious
speciﬁcation Local market correlation continues to be signiﬁcant and to dramatically
improve the explanatory power of the regressions.
As a further robustness check of our correlation variable, we use alternative mea-
sures of local market correlation. The detailed description of these variables is in Table
(II) and the univariate statistics and correlations are presented in Tables (X) and (XI)
respectively.
[INSERT Table (X) about here]
[INSERT Table (XI) about here]
The ﬁrst measure of correlation is the Morck et al. (2000) measure of stock price
synchronicity based on the standard CAPM/market factor linear regression. This is the
average R2 of ﬁrm-level regressions of bi-weekly stock returns in each country in 1995.
[INSERT Table (XII) about here]
16Under this framework a high R2 indicates a high degree of stock price synchronicity
and therefore a high correlation among stocks. We use the R2 data reported in Morck
et al. (2000) (as indicated in Table (IV)), henceforth the Morck R2, and perform the
same analysis as before. The results (shown in the third column of Table (XII)) are
qualitatively similar to our previous analysis. The estimated coeﬃcient is statistically
diﬀerent from zero (with a p-value of 2.6%) and with the predicted sign. Thus an
increase in Morck R2, all else being equal, is associated with an increase in Ownership
concentration. Adding Morck R2 increases the explanatory power of the regression based
on explanatory and control variables of La Porta et al. (1998) by almost 7% (see the
second and third column of Table (XII)).
It should be remembered that our main measure of local market correlation is a
weighted average of pair-wise correlations of 10 industry indexes of returns where the
weights are the indexes of stock market capitalization. To cope with the potential
problems arising with this weighing we consider an alternative measure of local market
correlation based on the average correlation among industry indexes (Equally weighted
pair-wise correlation).
A second potential problem for the correlation measure is that we do not ﬁnd the
same number of industries in all countries. Therefore, the second measure we consider
is the equally weighted correlation measure based on the same number of industries
for each country. Since for some countries there are only four industry indexes, we
used the four largest common industries in each country as a measure of local market
correlation (Correlation of 4 common industries). The third measure we consider as a
proxy for diversiﬁcation opportunities is the logarithm of the number of listed stocks.
The idea is that for diversiﬁcation opportunities to be available to portfolio investors,
risks must be traded in organized exchanges. Hence, the number of stocks listed in a
market oﬀers an indication of the diversiﬁcation opportunities available in the economy.
Using these three measures of diversiﬁcation opportunities we obtain results similar to
those presented above (see Table (XIII)). In particular, ownership is less concentrated
in countries with better diversiﬁcation opportunities.9
[INSERT Table (XIII) about here]
C.2 Omitted variables
It may be argued that the positive relationship between Local market correlation and
ownership concentration is due to the presence of some common observable and unob-
servable factors not controlled for in the above regressions that aﬀect both variables.
Although this is a classical critique that could be applied to many cross-country anal-
ysis, to address this issue we need to identify the factors that could aﬀect both variables.
The ﬁrst potential common factor is the variable Disclosure constructed by La Porta et
9We have considered alternative explanatory variables like stock market capitalization over GDP and
average market capitalization of ﬁrms and the results of the regressions are qualitatively unchanged.
17al. (2005). Disclosure is an index that considers six criteria: prohibition to sell securities
to investors without a prospectus; disclosure requirements regarding the compensation
of directors and key oﬃcers; disclosure requirements about ownership structure; disclo-
sure requirements about insiders’ ownership; disclosure requirements regarding outside
contracts by the issuers of new shares, and disclosure regarding transactions between
the issuers and related parties like its directors.
We regress Local market correlation against all previous control variables and the
Disclosure variable.
[INSERT Table (XIV) about here]
The ﬁrst column of Table (XIV) shows that the Disclosure variable does not signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀect Local market correlation, similarly to the other variables that measure poor
investor protection.
We then analyze if and how Disclosure aﬀects Ownership concentration. The second
column of Table (XIV) shows that its eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. To complete
the analysis we perform two additional regressions. The ﬁrst, shown in the third col-
umn, considers the two explanatory variable Disclosure and Local market correlation.
If Disclosure is the common factor that explains both Ownership concentration and Lo-
cal market correlation we should observe a decline of the explanatory power of Local
market correlation. However, the coeﬃcient of Local market correlation remains highly
statistically signiﬁcant. The last analysis that we perform to disentangle the role of
Disclosure is the creation of a variable for Local market correlation which is by con-
struction independent from Disclosure. We create this variable by orthogonalizing our
measure of Local market correlation with respect to all the control variables, the poor
investor protection variable and the Disclosure variable by considering the residuals of
the regression presented in the ﬁrst column. By construction the residual variable is not
aﬀected by the Disclosure variable. If minority shareholders protection and Disclosure
are common factors that capture all the eﬀects of Local market correlation on ownership
structure we should expect the residual variable to have no power to explain Ownership
concentration. We perform the same regression as before considering the Local market
correlation variable orthogonalized with respect to the previously mentioned variables.
The results presented in the fourth column of Table (XIV) show that the residual vari-
able is highly statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1% level as in the regression without the
Disclosure variable shown above). Therefore the results suggest that there are other
relevant aspects of Local market correlation that aﬀect Ownership concentration that
are not captured by rule of law or disclosure.
We repeated the analysis with a more parsimonious model (in line with La Porta et
al. 2005) and the results are shown in the Table (XV).10
[Insert Table (XV) about here]
10We have also repeated the analysis with the Morck R2 variable with qualitatively similar results.
18We used the same explanatory variables as La Porta et al. (2005). The ﬁrst column of
Table (XV) shows that the Disclosure variable is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
However, as shown in column two, it does not aﬀect Local market correlation. In columns
three and four we include in the regression of ownership concentration our measure of
Local market correlation and the results are that both Local market correlation and the
orthogonalized variable are highly statistically signiﬁcant.
We consider a second potential factor that could aﬀect both Ownership concentration
and Local market correlation. This is the Opacity measure used by Jin and Myers
(2004) and published by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2001). In Jin and Myers (2004)
the reason why lack of transparency (Opacity) about cash ﬂow matters for stock price
synchronicity is that it allows insiders to capture a higher fraction of the positive earning
surprises which outsiders are not exposed to. This lowers the amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risk that outsiders absorb and thus leads to a higher price synchronicity. Thus poor
investor protection alone does not aﬀect stock price synchronicity if ﬁrms are completely
transparent. Table (XVI) shows the results of regressions including Opacity.
[INSERT Table (XVI) about here]
In the ﬁrst column of Table (XVI) we show the results of the simple regression of
Local market correlation against opacity. The analysis shows that the Opacity variable
is negatively related with our measure of Local market correlation. In the second col-
umn we perform the same analysis with some control variables and it emerges again
that the role of Opacity in explaining Local market correlation is very limited. In the
third column we investigate whether Opacity could be considered a relevant factor for
Ownership concentration but the results do not suggest this. We then use both the
Opacity variable and the Local market correlation as explanatory variables and we see
that Local market correlation is still highly statistically signiﬁcant and its relevance for
Ownership concentration is not aﬀected by the Opacity variable.11
We then put Opacity and Disclosure together and the results are shown in Table
(XVII).
[Insert Table (XVII) about here]
The main result is again that Local market correlation is still relevant in explaining
Ownership concentration even after controlling for a series of potential common factors
like Opacity and Disclosure.12
Despite the remaining diﬃculty in accounting for unobservable factors that could
aﬀect both Ownership concentration and Local market correlation, we believe that our
11Jin and Myers (2004) used a logistic transformation of their R2 variable. We have also performed
our analysis considering as dependent variable the logistic transformation of local market correlation or
Morck-R2 and the results are qualitatively similar.
12We performed the same analysis shown above using the Morck R2 variable, instead of Local market
correlation, and the results are qualitatively similar.
19theoretical and empirical results represent a promising step towards the construction of
a more complete model of the relation between Ownership concentration and diversiﬁ-
cation opportunities.
C.3 Endogeneity
An additional potential critique is the possible presence of a reverse causality: namely,
Ownership concentration might aﬀect Local market correlation which therefore might
be endogenous. To cope with this problem we need to identify an instrument that aﬀects
Local market correlation but it does not aﬀect Ownership concentration. Our theoretical
model suggests that this instrument could be the variance of the stock index returns.
Notice that variance aﬀects correlation by construction but, as shown in equations (14),
(15), and (16), it does not inﬂuence the ownership structure.
In order to investigate the potential evidence against the exogeneity of Local market
correlation we perform a Hausman (1978) test. A detailed description of the procedure is
provided in the appendix. The results of the Hausman test are shown in Table (XVIII).
When the instrumental variable is included, the residuals u are uncorrelated with the
error term of the Ownership concentration regression (column two) only if Local market
correlation is exogenous.
[INSERT Table (XVIII) about here]
Table (XVIII) shows that the coeﬃcient of the reduced form residuals u is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at any standard level (p-value 0.18) and therefore the Hausman test
rejects the hypothesis that Local market correlation is an endogenous variable. If we re-
peat the analysis with Morck R2 the residual coeﬃcient has a p-value of 0.88 (not shown
in Table XVIII) and thus the Hausman test largely rejects the hypothesis of endogeneity.
Overall, our formal statistical tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of a zero cor-
relation between Ownership concentration and the unobserved determinants of Local
market correlation. Therefore, the Hausman test fails to reject the hypothesis that the
results obtained with OLS estimation shown in Tables (VII) and (XII) yield unbiased
and consistent results. The result of the test supports the conjecture that our measure
of Local market correlation is exogenous in Ownership concentration regressions. Never-
theless, this evidence is tentative because we use only one instrumental variable and the
dataset is limited. We argue that future progress will require a more structural approach
to the model.
20IV Extensions and Conclusions
This paper has developed a framework to analyze the interactions between diversiﬁcation
opportunities and Ownership concentration in an environment with control beneﬁts
arising from limited legal investor protection.
We have considered a mean-variance economy where the expected returns for con-
trolling and non-controlling shareholders are diﬀerent because the ﬁrst can divert part
of the proﬁts. This oﬀers a convenient simpliﬁed framework to study the general theme
of the tension between the need to diversify the portfolio of the controlling shareholder
and the small amount of external ﬁnance that can be raised when the possibility to
expropriate outsiders is ample.
We have obtained a number of results. First, we show that, when local market
correlation increases, each controlling shareholder invests a larger share of his wealth in
the asset he controls and a lower share in the assets he does not control.
Moreover, as a result of the previous ﬁnding, ownership becomes more concentrated
when diversiﬁcation opportunities decline. This is because an increase in correlation
aﬀects both the loss from foregone diversiﬁcation opportunities from concentrated port-
folios and the overall level of control beneﬁts that non-controlling investors are willing
to tolerate to achieve the excess returns on the risky investments.
Our objective in attempting to integrate the analysis of ﬁrms’ governance and own-
ership structure into a general equilibrium stock market economy with diﬀerent levels
of Local market correlation has been to show that correlation is an important variable
to explain ownership structure. This theoretical result is conﬁrmed by the empirical
analysis. We extend the La Porta et al. (1998) study and show that Local market cor-
relation has a relevant role in explaining Ownership concentration across countries. In
particular, ownership is more concentrated in countries where Local market correlation
is higher and this eﬀect is ampliﬁed by poor investor protection.
Our work can be extended in several directions, theoretical, institutional and em-
pirical. At the theoretical level an economy where entrepreneurs compete in the level
of proﬁt diversion to attract outside funds can be investigated. We can also generalize
our analysis to an economy with asymmetric parameters of asset returns, risk aversion
and market correlation. The more general issue of harmonization vs. competition in the
corporate governance law across countries can be tackled using our framework. At the
empirical level our analysis can also be conducted for a cross section of ﬁrms within the
same country. However, a deeper understanding of the problems at hand requires better
measures of proﬁt diversion and control beneﬁts.
21Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
First we want to prove that there is a suﬃciently high level of ρ < 1 such that when
b > 0 and the diversiﬁcation opportunities decline each entrepreneur invests more in his
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∂ρ |ρ=0= 0, and limρ→1
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∂ρ > 0. Thus by continuity there exists a ρ, such that
0 < ρ < 1, above which the result holds.
Second, from (8) it is easy to see that
∂x∗
ji
∂ρ < 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2
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￿
22The model with n + 1 assets and n + 1 individuals
Let x′
j = (xj1,...,xjn) be the row vector of the proportion of the wealth of individual
j,j = 1,...,n + 1, invested in assets 1,...,n. Using the accounting identity linking the
individual portfolio shares and the total investment in the risky assets
Ii = x1iW1+,...,+xn+1iWn+1, i = 1,...,n, (20)
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where y′ = ((m − 1 − b),...,(m − 1 − b)) denotes the row vector of the expected rates
of return on the risky assets, ej represents the j−th column vector of the canonical base
in ℜn,13 and Ω is the n×n matrix of the correlation coeﬃcients between the returns on
the risky assets.14
The terms in the square bracket of (21) and (22) represent the risk-adjusted rate of
portfolio return per unit of wealth, the last term of (21) represents the proﬁt diverted
by entrepreneur j as a result of the investment decisions of all the individuals. If the
conditions for the invertibility of the matrix Ω are satisﬁed, i.e. if


























with A ≡ (1 − ρ)(1 + (n − 1)ρ).
13That is the transpose of ej, is e′
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23The ﬁrst order conditions of the optimization of (21) and (22) s.t. (20) and the




2xjΩ + bej = 0, j = 1,...,n; y − λσ
2xn+1Ω = 0. (25)
The vector of the optimal shares of risky assets in the portfolios of the n+1 individuals
are
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we obtain the ownership structure.
24For example entrepreneur i owns α∗




(m − 1)(1 − ρ) + (n − 1)ρb
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2 > 0.
Hausman test
Let’s estimate the equation
  ρi = c + d1Xi + d2σ
2
i (36)
where   ρi is the ﬁtted value of ρi, local market correlation, Xi is the vector of common
explanatory variables of ρi, and ownership structure, αii. σ2
i is the instrumental variable,
i.e. the returns variance. To perform the Hausman test we calculate the residual
ui = ρi −  ρi (37)
and decompose the local market correlation ρi into two components
ρi =   ρi + ui. (38)
The ﬁrst element on the RHS of (38) is uncorrelated with the error terms of the equation
(36) by construction. The second component is uncorrelated with the error term only
if ρi is exogenous. If ρi is exogenous, then changes in   ρi or ui should have exactly the
same impact on αii in the ownership structure equation, i.e.
αii = c + γXi + β1  ρi + β1ui + εi. (39)
If ρi is endogenous then the coeﬃcient on ui will be diﬀerent, reﬂecting the distorting
impact of the correlation between the residual ui and the errors in equation (39); i.e.:
αii = c + γXi + β1  ρi + β2ui + εi. (40)
25where β1  = β2. Rather than testing for the diﬀerence between β1 and β2 it is common
to use a t-test after replacing   ρi with ρi − ui in (40); thus we have:
αii = c + γXi + β1ρi + (β2 − β1)ui + εi. (41)
The results of our analysis are shown in Table (XVIII). The Hausman test fails to reject
the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient (β2 − β1) is equal to zero.
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The parameters used are: m = 1.1, W3 = 1.
Ownership shares are from equations (14), (15) (16).
29Table II: Variables description
Variables Variables description
Ownership The average percentage of common shares owned by the
concentration three largest shareholders in the ten largest
non-ﬁnancial, privately owned domestic ﬁrms in a
given country constructed by La Porta et al. (1998).
Antidirectors Antidirectors rights index constructed by
rights La Porta et al. (1998)
Mandatory Mandatory Dividend index constructed by La Porta et
dividend al. (1998). Equals the percentage of net income that the
Company Law or Commercial Code requires to distribute
as dividends among ordinary stockholders.
Legal reserve Legal Reserve required index constructed by La Porta et
required al. (1998). It is the percentage of total share capital
mandated by Corporate Law to avoid the dissolution
of an existing ﬁrm.
Accounting Accounting standards index constructed by La Porta
et al. (1998). Index created by examining and rating
companies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or
omission of 90 items.
Ln(GDP) Natural logarithm of GDP. Source: World Bank and IMF.
Ln(GNP per capita) Natural logarithm of GNP per capita. Source: World Bank
and IMF
French Origin Dummy for the French Origin of the legal system
German Origin Dummy for the German Origin of the legal system
English Origin Dummy for the English Origin of the legal system
Scandinavian Origin Dummy for the Scandinavian Origin of the legal system
Gini Coeﬃcient Gini coeﬃcient for income inequality in each country.
When the 1995 coeﬃcient is not available we use the
previous available year. Source: World Bank.
Local market correlation Country correlations. Determined calculating the weighted
average of correlations among industry indexes in the
diﬀerent single countries for the years 1998-2000.
The weights are the market capitalization of
diﬀerent indexes. Source: Datastream
30Table III: Variables description cont.
Variables Variables description
Variance Country variance. Determined calculating the weighted
average of variances of industry indexes in the diﬀerent
countries for the years 1998-2000. The weights are
the market capitalization of diﬀerent indexes.
Source: Datastream
Equally weighted Country correlations. Determined calculating the simple
correlation average of correlations between industry indexes in the
diﬀerent countries for the years 1998-2000.
Source: Datastream.
Correlation of 4 Country correlations. Determined calculating the simple
common industries average of correlations among the four largest common
industry indexes in the diﬀerent countries for the
years 1998-2000. Source: Datastream.
Ln(Number of listed stocks) Natural logarithm of the number of listed stocks, year
2000. Source: Datastream.
Disclosure Disclosure index constructed by La Porta et al. (2003).
Disclosure is an index that considers six criteria: prohibition
to sell securities to investors without a prospectus;
disclosure requirements regarding the compensation
of directors and key oﬃcers; disclosure requirements
about ownership structure; disclosure requirements
about insiders’ ownership; disclosure requirements
regarding outside contracts by the issuers of new shares,
and disclosure regarding transactions between the issuers
and related parties like its directors.
Opacity Index of accounting “opacity” published by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2001)
Morck R2 Average R2 of ﬁrm-level regression of bi-weekly stock
returns in each country in 1995.
Source: Morck et al. (2000).







Correlation Morck R2 Variance
Argentina 0.53 4 0.68 - 0.0139
Australia 0.28 4 0.23 0.064 0.0025
Austria 0.58 2 0.51 0.093 0.0062
Belgium 0.54 0 0.53 0.146 0.0052
Brazil 0.57 3 0.62 0.161 0.0154
Canada 0.40 5 0.40 0.062 0.0080
Chile 0.45 5 0.56 0.209 0.0069
Denmark 0.45 2 0.26 0.075 0.0060
Finland 0.37 3 0.48 0.142 0.0170
France 0.34 3 0.53 0.075 0.0079
Germany 0.48 1 0.40 0.114 0.0077
Greece 0.67 2 0.71 0.192 0.216
Hong Kong 0.54 5 0.59 0.150 0.0133
Indonesia 0.58 2 0.55 0.140 0.0241
Ireland 0.39 4 0.29 0.058 0.0085
Israel 0.51 3 0.55 - 0.0100
Italy 0.58 1 0.53 0.183 0.0087
Japan 0.18 4 0.43 0.234 0.0061
Malaysia 0.54 4 0.80 0.429 0.0238
Mexico 0.64 1 0.63 0.290 0.0109
Netherlands 0.39 2 0.37 0.103 0.0073
New Zealand 0.48 4 0.43 0.064 0.0056
Norway 0.36 4 0.48 0.119 0.0101
Peru 0.56 3 0.26 0.288 0.0088
Philippines 0.57 3 0.65 0.164 0.0138
Portugal 0.52 3 0.61 0.068 0.0092
Singapore 0.49 4 0.60 0.191 0.0155
South Africa 0.52 5 0.61 0.197 0.0140
South Korea 0.23 2 0.59 0.172 0.0345
Spain 0.51 4 0.62 0.192 0.0083
Sweden 0.28 3 0.39 0.142 0.0109
Switzerland 0.41 2 0.54 - 0.0065
Taiwan 0.18 3 0.56 0.412 0.0141
Thailand 0.47 2 0.62 0.271 0.0363
Turkey 0.59 2 0.80 0.393 0.0509
UK 0.19 5 0.36 0.062 0.0054
USA 0.20 5 0.41 0.021 0.0056
Venezuela 0.51 1 0.59 - 0.0388
Sources: Ownership concentration and Antidirectors rights are from La Porta
et al. (1998); Local market correlation is the weighted average of correlations
between industry indexes in the single countries; Morck R2 is the measure of
stock returns synchronicity constructed by Morck et al. (2000); Variance is
the average of variances of industry indexes in the single countries.
32Table V: Univariate statistics of the variables
Mean Std. Dev. Max Min N. of Obs
Ownership
concentration 0.45 0.13 0.67 0.18 38
Antidirectors
rights 3.03 1.35 5.00 0.00 38
Accounting 63.25 11.45 83.00 36.00 36
Mandatory dividend 0.03 0.10 0.50 0.00 38
Legal reserve required 0.14 0.20 1.00 0.00 38
Local mkt. correlation 0.52 0.13 0.80 0.23 38
Variance 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 38
Gini Coeﬃcient 38.89 8.95 59.00 24.9 38
Ln (GDP) 7.55 2.86 15.86 4.97 38
Ln (GNP per capita) 2.25 1.06 3.58 -0.30 38
Table VI: Correlation between main variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1.
Ownership
concentration 1 -0.37 -0.48 0.25 -0.25 0.50 -0.15 -0.49 0.41
2.
Antidirectors
rights 1 0.37 0.04 -0.28 -0.13 -0.02 0.09 0.22
3. Accounting 1 -0.25 -0.19 -0.23 0.02 0.02 -0.24
4. Mand. dividends 1 0.07 0.23 -0.08 -0.24 0.10
5. Legal reserves required 1 0.14 0.11 0.09 -0.34
6. Local market correlation 1 0.14 -0.45 0.36
7. Ln(GDP) 1 -0.33 0.11
8. Ln(GNP per ca.) 1 -0.57
9. Gini Coeﬃcient 1
N. of Observations 38 38 36 38 38 38 38 38 38
33Table VII: Regression of ownership concentration on local market correlation,














































































Number of observations 36 36 36
F-statistic 4.155a 3.893a 5.942a
Adjusted R2 0.351 0.452 0.608
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
34Table VIII: Regression of ownership concentration on the product among local
market correlation and investor protection and economy structural variables


































































Number of observations 36 36
F-statistic 3.893a 5.942a
Adjusted R2 0.452 0.608
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
35Table IX: Parsimonious regression of ownership concentration on local market
correlation, investor protection and economy structural variables (Robust







































Number of observations 38 38 38
F-statistic 9.336a 9.111a 13.699a
Adjusted R2 0.310 0.467 0.632
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Table X: Univariate statistics of the variables
Mean Std. Dev. Max Min N. of Obs
Morck R2 0.17 0.10 0.43 0.02 34
Equally weighted correlation 0.50 0.14 0.80 0.23 38
Correlation of 4 common industries 0.55 0.13 0.78 0.28 38
Ln(Number of listed stocks) 5.97 0.99 8.43 4.85 38
Variance 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 38
Disclosure 0.62 0.22 1.00 0.17 38
Opacity 2.91 0.26 3.41 2.5 21
36Table XI: Correlation between main variables
Morck R2 Eq.w.cor Cor. 4 ind. Ln(N stocks) Variance Disclosure Opacity
Ownership
concentration 0.24 0.56 0.36 -0.56 0.23 -0.44 -0.25
Antidirectors
rights -0.17 -0.03 0.01 0.41 -0.29 0.54 0.40
Mandatory
dividend 0.05 0.18 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.35 0.04
Legal reserves
required 0.46 0.09 0.19 -0.11 0.13 -0.12 -0.27
Local market
correlation 0.59 0.92 0.74 -0.38 0.60 -0.02 -0.39
Ln(GDP) 0.43 0.29 0.24 0.11 0.54 0.19 -0.41
Ln(GNP p. capita) -0.49 -0.59 -0.36 0.38 -0.54 0.15 0.61
Gini Coeﬃcient 0.33 0.51 0.36 -0.21 0.25 0.18 0.07
N. of Observation 38 38 38 38 38 38 21
37Table XII: Regression of ownership concentration on shareholders rights,













































































Number of observations 32 32 32
F-statistic 3.534 3.725a 4.189a
Adjusted R2 0.329 0.467 0.531
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
38Table XIII: Regression of ownership concentration on shareholders rights, al-
ternative measures of diversiﬁcation opportunities, and economy structural














































































Correlation of 4 common industries
0.322b
(0.149)










Number of observations 36 36 36
F-statistic 5.414a 4.532a 4.538a
Adjusted R2 0.581 0.526 0.526
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
39Table XIV: Regression of ownership concentration and local market correlation




























































































































Number of observations 36 36 36 36
F-statistic 1.319 3.495a 5.477a 5.477a
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.439 0.606 0.606
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
40Table XV: Parsimonious regression of ownership concentration and local mar-

















































































Number of observations 38 38 38 38
F-statistic 2.100c 6.111a 8.003a 8.004
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.453 0.569 0.569
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
41Table XVI: Regression of ownership concentration and local market correlation
on opacity, measures of diversiﬁcation opportunities, and economy structural














































Number of observations 21 21 21
F-statistic 3.26 0.605 9.146a
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.109 0.709
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
42Table XVII: Regression of ownership concentration and local market correla-





























































Number of observations 21 21 21
F-statistic 3.925 0.497 8.364a
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.177 0.720
a=signiﬁcant at 1% level, b=signiﬁcant at 5% level, c=signiﬁcant at 10% level.
43Table XVIII: Hausman test on the endogeneity of local market correlation











































Number of observations 38 38
F-statistic 4.212a 12.187a
Adjusted R2 0.303 0.645







































































Figure 1: Local market correlation vs. minority shareholders protection
ARG=Argentina, AUS=Australia, AUT=Austria, BEL=Belgium, BRA=Brazil, CAN=Canada,
CHL=Chile, DNK=Denmark, FIN=Finland, FRA=France, DEU=Germany, GRC=Greece,
HKG=Hong Kong, IDN=Indonesia, IRL=Ireland, ISR=Israel, ITA=Italy, JPN=Japan,
MYS=Malaysia, MEX=Mexico, NLD=Netherlands, NZL=New Zealand, NOR=Norway, PER=Peru,
PHL=Philippines, PRT=Portugal, SGP=Singapore, ZAF=South Africa, KOR=South Korea,
ESP=Spain, SWE=Sweden, CHE=Switzerland, YWN=Taiwan, THA=Thailand, TUR=Turkey,
GBR=UK, USA=United States and VEN=Venezuela.
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